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NOTE
THE EFFECT ON THE CHILD OF A CUSTODIAL PAR-
ENT'S INVOLVEMENT IN AN INTIMATE SAME-SEX
RELATIONSHIP - North Carolina Adopts the "Nexus
Test" in Pulliam v. Smith1
I. INTRODUCTION
The State has a "duty of the highest order" to protect the wel-
fare of children.2 In child custody proceedings in North Carolina,
courts carry out this duty by granting custody to the parent or
third party that will best promote the interest and welfare of the
child.3 A trial judge is given broad discretion to determine what is
best for the child and what parental conduct will adversely affect
the child.4 With such broad discretion, however, comes the danger
that a trial judge's private biases regarding a parent's conduct or
circumstances will unfairly influence custody determinations.
Custody determinations are particularly vulnerable to preju-
dice and bias when courts examine a parent's sexual conduct and
its effect on the child. A parent's sexual conduct, like evidence of
other conduct, is relevant to child custody determinations. 5 How-
ever, since evidence regarding sexual conduct also reveals a par-
ent's sexual orientation, a trial judge's private biases regarding
1. -N.C. App. -,476 S.E.2d 446(1996) (as of the date of publication this
case did not appear in the official reporter).
2. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (1995); Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. i89, 197,
146 S.E.2d 73, 79 (1966) ("The welfare or best interest of the child, in light of all
the circumstances, is the paramount consideration which guides the court in
awarding the custody of the minor child. It is the polar star by which the
discretion of the court is guided.").
4. Blackley v. Blackley, 285 N.C. 358, 362, 204 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1974).
5. Hunt v. Hunt, 29 N.C. App. 380, 383, 224 S.E.2d 270, 271 (1976); Darden
v. Darden, 20 N.C. App. 433, 435, 201 S.E.2d 538, 539 (1974).
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the fitness of a parent involved in an intimate same-sex relation-
ship often influence custody determinations.'
In Pulliam v. Smith,7 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
took the first step toward eliminating the effects of prejudice and
bias in custody disputes involving a parent in an intimate same-
sex relationship. In Pulliam, the court held that a trial judge's
finding that a parent's involvement in an intimate same-sex rela-
tionship adversely affects the child must be based on more than
just the judge's opinion, speculation and conjecture. s In North
Carolina, a court cannot conclude that a child is adversely affected
by a parent's involvement in an intimate same-sex relationship,
unless the moving party produces evidence that "the conduct has
or will likely have a deleterious effect on the children."9
This Note examines the North Carolina Court of Appeals deci-
sion in Pulliam v. Smith. 10 First, the Note discusses the facts of
the case and the opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
Then, the Note examines (1) child custody law in North Carolina;
(2) North Carolina case law addressing the effect on the child of a
custodial parent's sexual conduct and sexual orientation; and (3)
child custody disputes in other jurisdictions which involve a custo-
dial parent in an intimate same-sex relationship. Next, the Note
analyzes the decision in Pulliam and its effect on child custody
law in North Carolina. Finally, the Note concludes that the North
Carolina Court of Appeals reached the correct and proper
outcome.
6. See Julie Shapiro, Custody and Conduct: How The Law Fails Lesbian and
Gay Parents and Their Children, 71 IND. L.J. 623, 660-64 (1996).
Some judges are deeply biased against lesbians and gay men, or less
commonly, against individuals who engage in nonmarital heterosexual
sex. For these judges, taking children away from lesbian and gay
parents may be perceived as necessary without regard for any evidence.
Denying custody or visitation may also serve the additional purpose of
punishing the parent for immoral or improper conduct. Other judges
may be fearful of the reaction of the electorate or specific communities
within the electorate within which they live.
Id. at 660.
7. - N.C. App. -, 476 S.E.2d 446.
8. Id. at -, 476 S.E.2d at 449.
9. Id. at -, 476 S.E.2d at 450.
10. Id. at -, 476 S.E.2d at 446.
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II. THE CASE
Frederick Smith ("Smith") and Carol Pulliam ("Pulliam"), for-
merly Carol Smith, were married in November of 1982.11 Two
children were born to the marriage. 12 In September 1990, Smith
and Pulliam were separated and Pulliam moved to Kansas to live
with William Pulliam.13 The children remained with Smith, their
father. 14
In November of 1991, a California court awarded Smith and
Pulliam joint custody of the children and Smith was awarded pri-
mary physical custody. 15 From 1991 until August of 1994, the
children lived in North Carolina with their father and his grand-
mother. 16 Smith's grandmother helped care for the children while
their father was at work. 17
In early 1994, Frederick Smith became involved in an inti-
mate same-sex relationship with Tim Tipton,' and in August of
1994, Tipton moved into Smith's home. 19 Tipton has lived with
Smith and his children since this date.20
While living with their father, both children maintained
above-average grades and good attendance records in school. 2'
Smith regularly attended parent-teacher conferences2 2 and helped
both boys with their homework.2 s Smith also coached one child's
tee-ball team and helped coach the other child's baseball team.24
11. Id. at 447.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Brief for Appellant at 2, Pulliam v. Smith, - N.C. App. -, 476 S.E.2d
446 (1996) (No. COA95-1220).
15. Record at 28-29, Pulliam v. Smith, - N.C. App. -, 476 S.E.2d 446
(1996) (No. COA95-1220).
16. Pulliam, __ N.C. App. at _ , 476 S.E.2d at 447. Since the divorce in
1991, the children have lived with Carol and William Pulliam in Kansas for two
months out of the summer. Carol and William Pulliam were not married until
February 1993. Record at 34. Carol Pulliam is employed as a waitress/cook and
earns approximately $250.00 per week. Id. at 30.
17. Record at 29. Frederick Smith works for General Electric in
Hendersonville, North Carolina and earns approximately $449.00 per week.
Pulliam, - N.C. App. at __, 476 S.E.2d at 447.
18. Record at 32.
19. Pulliam, - N.C. App. at __, 476 S.E.2d at 447.
20. Record at 32.
21. Brief for Appellant at 2.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id.
1996]
3
Parrott: The Effect on the Child of a Custodial Parent's Involvement in an
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1996
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
Tipton assisted Smith in the care of the children.25 Tipton
took the boys to school, helped them with their homework, cooked
their meals, and took care of the children while Smith was
working.26
Tipton and Smith sleep in the same bed in a room across the
hall from the two boys.27 They openly embrace and kiss each
other while the children are present, however, all other sexual
activity occurs in the privacy of their bedroom.28
When Carol Pulliam discovered that Smith was in a same-sex
relationship with Tipton, she forced Smith to tell their youngest
child, who was six years old at the time, about the nature of
Smith's relationship with Tipton.29 Carol Pulliam threatened to
tell the child herself if Smith refused to do so. 30 The child became
upset during the conversation with his parents and left the room
in tears.3 1
In November, Carol Pulliam sought a change of custody due
to changed circumstances.3 2 In addition to the above findings, the
trial court made the following findings of fact:
(17) That the two minor children on at least two days during their
Easter/Spring break of 1995 accompanied Tim Tipton on his job
maintaining lawns. That the Defendant testified that on at least
one occasion when the two children accompanied Tipton, Defend-
ant had no knowledge of who owned the said property that was
being maintained by Tipton or where the said property was
located ....
(24) That the [youngest] child... , sometime after being informed
that the Defendant and Mr. Tipton were engaged in a homosexual
25. Record at 30.
26. Brief for Appellant at 3.
27. Pulliam, - N.C. App. at - , 476 S.E.2d at 448.
28. Id.
29. Brief for Appellant at 3.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Pulliam, - N.C. App. _, 476 S.E.2d 446. In the complaint filed by
Carol Pulliam, five of the seven facts supporting her allegations of changed
circumstances address Frederick Smith's same-sex relationship with Tim Tipton.
One fact addresses the emotional stability of Frederick Smith and another fact
addresses the re-marriage of Carol Pulliam. Brief for Appellant at 4. Carol
Smith also testified that because of the "impact of the homosexual thing," she
believed the children would be better off in her custody. Pulliam, _ N.C. App.
at -, 476 S.E.2d at 448.
33. Record at 30-31.
(Vol. 19:131
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relationship, asked Mr. Tipton if he (Mr. Tipton) was his step-
father.3
4
(26) That Defendant met Tim Tipton in February of 1994 at an
establishment that served alcohol and at which homosexuals rou-
tinely gathered in Asheville, North Carolina.3 5
(27) That prior to meeting Tim Tipton, the Defendant called a gay
and lesbian hot line.., because he was confused about his sexual
orientation .... 36
(29) Tim Tipton and the Defendant both testified that they engage
in oral sex.. . about once a week .... 37
(30) That [oral sex] is in violation of G.S. § 14-177 and is a Class I
Felony in the State of North Carolina .... 3
(33) The Defendant and Mr. Tipton on at least (1) occasion had a
party for homosexuals at the home .... That the occasion was an
anniversary party making the first year since the Defendant and
Tim Tipton met at a homosexual bar in Asheville, North
Carolina.3
9
(35) Mr. Tipton keeps in the bedroom he shares with the Defend-
ant pictures of "drag queens." These are pictures of men dressed
like women. These pictures are not under a lock, and it is possible
for the children to gain access to the pictures.40
(37) That the [youngest] child . . . on one or more occasions
observed the Defendant and Tipton in bed together.4 1
(38) That the minor children never have friends stay over night
while they are residing with the Defendant.
42
34. Id. at 31-32.
35. Id. at 32. The trial court also found that "[tihe Defendant and Mr. Tipton
on at least three (3) occasions since first meeting have gone to an establishment
that caters to homosexuals. Id. at 33.
36. Id. at 32.
37. Id.
38. Id. The trial court also found "that despite the fact that the said behavior
[oral sex] is a violation of G.S. § 14-177 the Defendant testified that there was
nothing wrong with his relationship with Tim Tipton." Id.
39. Id. at 33.
40. Id. The trial court also found that "Mr. Tipton testified that these
materials (photographs of "drag queens") were not something that a child should
be subjected to . " Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
1996] 135
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(39) Uncontroverted evidence was presented that on at least two
occasions the Defendant struck the [youngest] child . . . on or
about the head ....
(49) That from the evidence presented the Court would find that
the Defendant's conduct is not fit and proper and will expose the
two minor male children to unfit and improper influences.4 4
(50) That there is a possibility of exposing the children to embar-
rassment and humiliation in public because of the homosexuality
of the Defendant and his relationship with Tim Tipton.45
(51) At a recent trip to Six Flags amusement park in Atlanta...
the Defendant and Tim Tipton while in the presence of the minor
children became embroiled in a dispute with third parties result-
ing from a cigarette butt being flicked or thrown at Tim Tipton.
That a brief time after the cigarette butt was thrown or flicked
onto Mr. Tipton, the individual responsible for throwing the ciga-
rette butt and others began to huddle around the Defendant, Mr.
Tipton, and the minor children. At this point Mr. Tipton stated to
the group that "I don't think this is funny," and the group started
laughing at Mr. Tipton and continued to annoy and harass Mr.
Tipton. The Defendant then said to Mr. Tipton that it was not
worth it and the Defendant, Mr. Tipton, and the minor children
fled the group of people. That under the circumstances as
described by the witnesses to the events that transpired at Six
Flags, the Court finds as a fact that the homosexual relationship
of the Defendant and Mr. Tipton probably precipitated the distur-
bance. The Court further finds as a fact that the response of the
third parties probably placed the two minor children in physical
danger. The Court also finds as a fact that the two minor children
will probably or likely be exposed to that same danger of potential
physical harm and/or public humiliation in the future as a result
of the homosexual activity of the Defendant.46
(52) That based on the foregoing findings of fact the Defendant is
not providing a fit and proper environment for the rearing of the
two minor children. Living daily under the conditions stemming
from active homosexuality practiced in the Defendant's home may
impose a burden upon the two minor children by reason of the
social condemnation attached to such an arrangement, which will
inevitably afflict the two children's relationships with their peers
and with the community at large.47
43. Id.
44. Id. at 34.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 34-35.
47. Id. at 35.
[Vol. 19:131136
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(53) The activity of the Defendant will likely create emotional diffi-
culties for the two minor children. That evidence was presented
that the [youngest] child... cried when he was told by the Defend-
ant that he (Defendant) was homosexual. This evidence leads the
Court to find that the... child... may already be experiencing
emotional difficulties because of the active homosexuality of the
Defendant. Furthermore the Court finds that it is likely that the
[oldest] child.., will also experience emotional difficulties because
of the active homosexuality of the Defendant.4"
Not included in the trial courts findings of fact was that dur-
ing one of the parties at Smith's home, the boys stayed at their
great-grandmother's house because Smith thought the children
should not be in an atmosphere where there was drinking.49 The
trial court also failed to acknowledge the youngest child's testi-
mony that he "feels comfortable" around Tipton, he likes Tipton's
cooking, and he has no preference as to which parent he lives
with.50
Based on the above evidence, the trial judge concluded "[tihat
since the California judgment the Defendant is exposing the two
minor children to conduct which is not fit and proper."5' The Court
further concluded that there had been a substantial change of cir-
cumstances which adversely affects or will likely adversely affect
the two minor children and that it was in the best interest of the
children that Pulliam have exclusive custody.5 2 Finally, the Court
concluded that "it is in the best interest of the two minor children
that they not reside under the same roof as Mr. Tipton or any
other person with whom the Defendant is having a homosexual
relationship."5 3
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the trial court.54 On appeal, the issues presented to the court
were (1) whether the conclusion of a substantial change of circum-
stances is supported by the findings and (2) whether the findings
are supported by the evidence. 5 The court held that the findings
as expressed by the trial court support the conclusion, but that the
48. Id.
49. Pulliam, - N.C. App. at -, 476 S.E.2d at 448.
50. Id.
51. Record at 36.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Pulliam, - N.C. App. - , 476 S.E.2d 446 (1996).
55. Id. at -, 476 S.E.2d at 449.
1996]
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order of the trial court must fail because the findings are not sup-
ported by the evidence.
III. THE BACKGROUND
A. Child Custody Law in North Carolina
When families are torn apart by legal separation and divorce,
parents often find it difficult to agree on child custody arrange-
ments. Therefore, courts are called upon to make these decisions.
Child custody law in North Carolina mandates that the court
resolve the initial custody determination by awarding custody to
the parent or third party that will best promote the interest and
welfare of the child.5 7 The trial judge has broad discretion in mak-
ing this determination18 and can consider any number of factors
that may affect the welfare of the child. 59 Furthermore, when cus-
tody disputes are between a child's natural or adoptive parents, no
presumption shall apply as to who will better promote the interest
and welfare of the child.6 °
The initial custody decree is not permanent in nature, and
can be altered, modified, or reversed if (1) either party or anyone
interested can show that there has been a substantial change of
circumstances since the initial custody proceeding, and (2) the
court determines that a change of custody is in the best interest of
56. Id.
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (1995); See supra note 3.
58. Blackley, 285 N.C. at 362, 204 S.E.2d at 681 (A trial judge has broad
discretion since the judge has had the opportunity to see and hear the parties
and witnesses in the case.).
59. Phelps v. Phelps, 337 N.C. App. 344, 352, 446 S.E.2d 17, 22 (1994). Courts
have considered the sexual conduct of a parent, see supra note 5 and infra notes
70-71; the age of a parent, Phelps, 337 N.C. 344, 446 S.E.2d 17; the religious
practices of a parent, Peterson v. Rogers, 111 N.C. App. 712, 433 S.E.2d 770
(1993), rev'd on other grounds, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994); MacLagan v.
Klein, - N.C. App. -, 473 S.E.2d 778 (1996); and the child's preference to live
with a particular parent, Elmore v. Elmore, 4 N.C. App. 192, 166 S.E.2d 506
(1969).
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (1995); Phelps, 337 N.C. at 351, 446 S.E.2d
at 21; Westneat v. Westneat, 113 N.C. App. 247, 251, 437 S.E.2d 899, 901 (1994).
However, when an initial custody dispute is between a parent and a third party,
there is a presumption in favor of the parent. Peterson, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d
901 (absent a finding that parents are unfit or have neglected the welfare of their
children the constitutionally-protected paramount right of parents to custody,
care, and control of their children must prevail).
138 [Vol. 19:131
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the child.6 1 The party moving for modification of the custody
order has the burden of showing a substantial change of circum-
stances.6 2 To meet this burden, the moving party must show (1) a
change of circumstances since the initial custody proceeding (2)
which adversely affect the welfare of the child or will likely
adversely affect the welfare of the child.63 Once a substantial
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.7(a) (1995); Stanback v. Stanback, 266 N.C. 72,
75, 145 S.E.2d 332, 334 (1965) (orders in custody proceedings are not final);
Ramirez-Barker v. Barker, 107 N.C. App. 71, 418 S.E.2d 675 (1992). In change of
custody proceedings where a natural parent is seeking custody over a third
party, there is no presumption in favor of the natural parent. Speaks v. Fanek,
122 N.C. App. 389, 470 S.E.2d 82 (1996) (district court improperly applied
presumption of child custody in favor of natural parents that controlled only in
initial custody determinations).
62. Crosby v. Crosby, 272 N.C. 235, 237, 158 S.E.2d 77, 79 (1967); Ramirez-
Barker, 107 N.C. App. at 78, 418 S.E.2d at 679.
63. See Ramirez-Barker, 107 N.C. App. at 77-78, 418 S.E.2d at 678-79;
Purdue v. Purdue, 76 N.C. App. 600, 601, 334 S.E.2d 86, 87 (1985). A change in a
custodial parents residence is not in itself sufficient to show a substantial change
in circumstances. See Garrett v. Garrett, 121 N.C. App. 192, 464 S.E.2d 716
(1995); Dobos v. Dobos, 111 N.C. App. 222,431 S.E.2d 861 (1993); Kelly v. Kelly,
77 N.C. App. 632, 335 S.E.2d 780 (1985); Gordon v. Gordon, 46 N.C. App. 495,
265 S.E.2d 425 (1980); Searl v. Searl, 34 N.C. App. 583, 239 S.E.2d 305 (1977);
Harrington v. Harrington, 16 N.C. App. 628, 192 S.E.2d 638 (1972); Rothman v.
Rothman, 6 N.C. App. 401, 170 S.E.2d 140 (1969). However, such a change will
be sufficient to support a finding of substantial change in circumstances if the
change in residence can be shown to adversely affect the child. Ramirez-Barker,
107 N.C. App. 71, 418 S.E.2d 675. A child's preference to live with a particular
parent has been considered. O'Briant v. O'Briant, 70 N.C. App. 360, 320 S.E.2d
277 (1984) (change of residence and child's preference to live with father is
sufficient to support a finding of substantial change of circumstance). Adulterous
conduct by the custodial parent will not in itself be sufficient to warrant a finding
of substantial change in circumstances. See infra note 70. Religious beliefs of
parents can only be considered in child custody disputes when such beliefs have
an adverse effect on the child. See MacLagan, - N.C. App. -, 473 S.E.2d 778;
Peterson, 111 N.C. App. 712, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1993), rev'd on other grounds, 337
N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994). Other changes that have been shown to
adversely affect the child will support a finding of substantial change in
circumstances. Correll v. Allen, 94 N.C. App. 464, 380 S.E.2d 580 (1989) (child's
psychological state and mother's hostility towards the father's visitation
supported a finding of substantial change in circumstances adversely affecting
the child); White v. White, 90 N.C. App. 553, 369 S.E.2d 92 (1988) (birth of two
additional children within two years to an unmarried woman together with the
mother's loss of her job was shown to adversely affect the minor child); Teague v.
Teague, 84 N.C. App. 545, 353 S.E.2d 242 (1987) (a finding that the child was in
poor health and exhibited poor conduct when with the mother was sufficient to
establish a substantial change of circumstances adversely affecting the welfare of
the child); King v. Demo, 40 N.C. App. 661, 253 S.E.2d 616 (1979) (physical
9
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change of circumstances is demonstrated, the court will conduct a
"best interest" analysis based on evidence submitted by the par-
ties. 64 However, if the moving party does not meet its burden of
showing changed circumstances, the court is without authority to
undergo a "best interest" analysis.6
A determination of changed circumstances is a question of
law which must be supported by findings of fact that demonstrate
"a nexus between the changes in circumstances and a concomitant
adverse affect (or likely affect) on the children involved."66 "Evi-
dence of 'speculation or conjecture that a detrimental change may
take place sometime in the future' will not support a change in
custody." 67 The order of the trial judge can only be disturbed on
appeal if the findings of fact are not supported by competent evi-
dence in the record.6 If either the evidence does not support the
findings of fact or the findings of fact do not form a valid basis for
the conclusions of law, the judgment of the trial court must be
reversed. 69
abuse being inflicted on the child); Dean v. Dean, 32 N.C. App. 482, 232 S.E.2d
470 (1977) (the birth of two illegitimate children and the mother's refusal to take
the children to church constitutes a sufficient change in circumstances to
warrant a change in custody); but see Kelly v. Kelly, 77 N.C. App. 632, 335 S.E.2d
780 (1985) (birth of an illegitimate child and mother's change of residence when
she married the baby's father were insufficient to find a substantial change
adversely affecting the child).
64. Ramirez-Barker, 107 N.C. App. at 78, 418 S.E.2d at 679. There is no
burden of proof on either party during the best interest analysis. Id.
65. See id. at 77, 418 S.E.2d at 678; Dobos, 111 N.C. App. at 226, 431 S.E.2d
at 863.
66. Garrett, 121 N.C. App. at 196, 464 S.E.2d at 719; accord Ramirez-Barker,
107 N.C. App. at 78, 418 S.E.2d at 679.
67. Ramirez-Barker, 107 N.C. App. at 78, 418 S.E.2d at 679 (quoting Wehlau
v. Witek, 75 N.C. App. 596, 599, 331 S.E.2d 223, 225 (1985)); Benedict v. Coe, 117
N.C. App. 369, 451 S.E.2d 320 (1994) (a finding that the custodial mother is
overprotective, without evidence that such conduct is harmful to the child, is not
sufficient to justify a finding that there has been a substantial change of
circumstances).
68. Blackley, 285 N.C. at 362, 204 S.E.2d at 681.
69. Paschall v. Paschall, 21 N.C. App. 120, 122, 203 S.E.2d 337, 337 (1974).
140 [Vol. 19:131
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B. North Carolina Case Law Addressing the Effect on the Child
of a Custodial Parent's Sexual Conduct and Sexual
Orientation
North Carolina courts have consistently ruled that adulterous
conduct 70 and an unmarried custodial parent's sexual conduct and
involvement in an intimate opposite-sex relationship 7' does not
per se adversely effect a child or render a parent unfit. Until Pul-
liam, North Carolina courts had not directly addressed whether a
child is per se adversely affected by the custodial parent's involve-
ment in an intimate same-sex relationship. Two previous custody
disputes have involved parents who allegedly engaged in homo-
sexual conduct.72 Only one custody dispute has involved a parent
who was involved in an intimate same-sex relationship. v
In Spence v. Durham the mother sought a change of custody
due to changed circumstances.74 Three years prior to this action,
70. See Surles v. Surles, 113 N.C. App. 32, 437 S.E.2d 66 (1993) (adultery is
not a sufficient reason to deny custody to a parent); Green v. Green, 54 N.C. App.
571, 284 S.E.2d 171 (1981) (adulterous conduct, in and of itself, is insufficient to
determine custody); Pendergraft v. Pendergraft, 23 N.C. App. 307, 309, 208
S.E.2d 887, 889 (1974) ("a parent who commits adultery does not by this fact
alone become unfit to have custody of children"); Savage v. Savage, 15 N.C. App.
123, 189 S.E.2d 545 (1972) (adultery does not render a parent unfit); In re
McGraw Children, 3 N.C. App. 390, 165 S.E.2d 1 (1969) (adulterous conduct does
not per se render a parent unfit). But see Wilson v. Wilson, 269 N.C. 676, 153
S.E.2d 349 (1967) (mother's adulterous relationship with a colored man was
sufficient to support a finding that mother was not a fit and suitable person to
have custody of her child); Thomas v. Thomas, 259 N.C. 461, 130 S.E.2d 871
(1963) (wife deemed unfit where it was shown that she had an illegitimate child
by another man after her separation from her husband).
71. See Williford v. Williford, 303 N.C. 178, 277 S.E.2d 515 (1981) (a custodial
father's fianc6 moving into the home is not sufficient to show a change in
circumstances adversely affecting the child); Blackley, 285 N.C. at 358, 204
S.E.2d at 678 ("premarital nighttime visits by the mother's present husband,
standing alone, [is] not sufficient to support modification of the custody decree");
Harris v. Harris, 56 N.C. App. 122, 286 S.E.2d 859 (1982) (mother allowing a
male to visit in the evenings, and on one occasion, to stay overnight did not
warrant a showing of substantial change in circumstances adversely affecting
the child); Almond v. Almond, 42 N.C. App. 658, 658 257 S.E.2d 450, 450 (1979)
("although cohabitation by unmarried persons of the opposite sex is not condoned
by this court, nor by the laws of the state, evidence of cohabitation alone is not
always sufficient to support a finding that a party is not a fit and proper person to
have custody of minor children").
72. Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d 537 (1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 918 (1974); Newsome v. Newsome, 42 N.C. App. 416, 256 S.E.2d 849 (1979).
73. Woodruff v. Woodruff, 44 N.C. App. 350, 260 S.E.2d 775 (1979).
74. Spence, 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d 537.
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the children's maternal and paternal grandparents had been
granted joint custody of the children. 75  At trial, testimony
revealed that some years ago both parents had engaged in inap-
propriate sexual conduct 76 and that the mother had allegedly
made homosexual advances to teenage girls in the presence of her
two daughters who were infants at the time.77 Spence testified
that she never had homosexual tendencies 78 and two expert wit-
nesses testified as to the fitness of Spence. 79 The trial judge held
there had been a substantial change of circumstances since the
initial custody proceedings and that, given the age of the grand-
parents, awarding custody to the mother was in the best interest
of the children."0
The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the trial judge
holding that the "evidence does not support the findings of fact
and that the findings of fact do not support the judgment.""1 The
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that the
trial judge did not abuse his discretion in awarding custody to the
mother.8 2 In the majority opinion, the Supreme Court addressed
the inappropriate sexual conduct of Spence that had occurred
some years ago, 3 not her sexual orientation or her involvement in
an intimate same-sex relationship with another adult.
In Newsome v. Newsome, the Court of Appeals affirmed a trial
court order granting custody of the child to the father and remov-
75. Id. at 675, 198 S.E.2d at 540.
76. Id. at 698, 198 S.E.2d at 552 (Lake, J., dissenting). The father had
"habitually committed adultery, maintaining his mistress, a teenage girl in the
home where he and the mother lived with these children." Id. The mother
consented to the father's behavior. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 699, 198 S.E.2d at 553.
79. Id. at 680, 198 S.E.2d at 543.
80. Id. at 682, 198 S.E.2d at 544.
81. Id. at 683, 198 S.E.2d at 544.
82. Id. at 687, 198 S.E.2d at 547.
83. In the initial custody decree the Georgia court found that "(1) the father
habitually committed adultery, maintaining his mistress, a teenage girl, in the
home where he and the mother lived with these children; (2) The mother
consented to, condoned, encouraged, aided and abetted in this conduct, going so
far as to turn over and go to sleep without protest when awakened by the father
and his mistress engaging in sexual intercourse while in the same bed with her,
and thereafter serving them breakfast in bed; and (3) the mother made sexual
advances to various teenage girls visiting her home sometimes in the presence of
her two daughters, then mere infants, the general course of these actions being
with the knowledge and consent of the father, her husband." Id. at 698, 198
S.E.2d at 552 (Lake, J., dissenting).
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ing custody from an alleged lesbian mother.8 4 William Newsome
alleged that his ex-wife, Cheryl Newsome, had engaged in an
illicit homosexual relationship with another woman."5 Cheryl
Newsome denied being homosexual.86
The trial judge made various findings of fact which supported
William Newsome's allegations, however, the judge did not find
that Cheryl Newsome was homosexual.87 The judge found that
Cheryl Newsome was a loving mother who was interested in the
well-being of her child, and that both parents were fit and proper
persons to have custody of the child."8 Notwithstanding this fact,
the trial judge concluded there had been a substantial change of
circumstances since the initial custody proceeding and William
Newsome should be awarded custody of the child.8 9
The Court of Appeals in Newsome affirmed the holding of the
trial court, however, the court held that it was unnecessary for
Mr. Newsome to show that there had been a substantial change of
circumstances. 90 Thus, after weighing the evidence, the trial
judge only needed to decide what was in the best interest of the
child. 91' The court did not find that Cheryl Newsome was involved
in a same-sex relationship or that Newsome's conduct had
adversely affected her child. Therefore, Newsome, like Spence,
provides little guidance in determining the effect of a parent's
involvement in an intimate same-sex relationship on the child.
Prior to Pulliam, Woodruff v. Woodruff 92 was the only North
Carolina child custody case which involved a parent in an inti-
mate same-sex relationship. In Woodruff, the Court of Appeals
affirmed a trial court order granting a homosexual father
unsupervised overnight visitation rights with his son.93 The trial
84. Newsome, 42 N.C. App. 416, 256 S.E.2d 849.
85. Id. at 418, 256 S.E.2d at 850.
86. Id. at 421, 256 S.E.2d at 852.
87. Id. at 423, 256 S.E.2d at 853.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 424, 256 S.E.2d at 854. The court held that "there is no indication
... that [initial] custody was litigated and decided by the judge after hearing
evidence tending to show the circumstances as they then existed relating to the
best interest of the child." Id. Therefore, the court concluded that there was no
need to show a substantial change in circumstances. Id.
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (1995).
92. Woodruff, 44 N.C. App. 350, 260 S.E.2d 775.
93. Id.
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court found that Sammy Woodruff has homosexual tendencies. 94
The court also concluded that Sammy" Woodruff was a "fit and
proper parent."95 Thus, the holding in Woodruff supports the con-
tention that the sexual orientation of a parent will not per se
adversely affect the child or render a parent unfit.
C. Child Custody Disputes in Other Jurisdictions Which
Involve a Custodial Parent in an Intimate Same-Sex
Relationship
Numerous jurisdictions have been presented with custody dis-
putes involving a custodial parent in an intimate same-sex rela-
tionship.9 6 These jurisdictions have adopted one of three basic
approaches to determine whether a parent's involvement in an
intimate same-sex relationship harms or will likely harm the
child.97 A minority of courts have adopted either a per se
approach98  or a "permissible determinative inference"
approach.9 9 A majority of courts have adopted a "nexus test."10 0
Courts that adopt the per se approach disqualify any parent
who engages in "particular conduct or exhibits particular charac-
teristics."10 1 All parents who engage in certain conduct or "fall
into a particular category - for example, all lesbian or gay par-
ents, or more broadly, all parents cohabiting with another adult to
whom they are not married" are considered unfit to have custody
of a child.10 2 In Roe v. Roe, the Virginia Supreme Court adopted
the per se approach in reversing a trial court order granting cus-
tody of the child to a homosexual father. '0 3 The Virginia Supreme
Court held that the father's "continuous exposure of the child to
94. Id. at 352, 260 S.E.2d at 776.
95. Id. at 352, 260 S.E.2d at 776.
96. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995); In re R.E.W., 471 S.E.2d 6
(Ga. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 472 S.E.2d 295 (Ga. 1996); Scott v. Scott, 665 So. 2d
760 (La. Ct. App. 1995); T.C.H. v. K.M.H., 784 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989);
J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730
S.W.2d 510 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987); M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1986); S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691
(Va. 1985); M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); See
generally Shapiro, supra note 6, at 625.
97. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 625.
98. Id. at 626.
99. Id. at 634.
100. Id. at 626.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 633.
103. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691.
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his immoral and illicit relationship renders him an unfit and
improper custodian as a matter of law."1°4 Few courts, however,
have adopted a true per se approach.105
In the "permissive determinative inference" approach, courts
permit a trial judge to "infer harm to a child in the absence of any
evidence of harm. Further, the permissible inference is one that,
standing alone, can justify the court's decision to deny custody." 0 6
In Thigpen v. Carpenter,10 7 the Arkansas Court of Appeals
applied the "permissive determinative inference" approach.' 08 In
Thigpen, the Court of Appeals held that "it has never been neces-
sary to prove that illicit sexual conduct on the part of the custodial
parent is detrimental to the children."10 9
The "permissive determinative inference" approach differs
from the per se approach. When courts adopt a per se rule, the
trial judge has no discretion; he or she is bound to hold in accord-
ance with adopted rules. 10 However, when a court adopts a "per-
missive determinative inference" approach, the trial judge is
vested with "an absolute and unreviewable discretion, for an infer-
ence is permitted even in the absence of supporting evidence.""'
Furthermore, "a court's decision to draw [or not to draw] the infer-
ence can never be deemed incorrect on appeal."" 2
A majority of jurisdictions use a "nexus test" approach to
determine whether a parent's involvement in an intimate same-
sex relationship adversely affects or will likely adversely affect the
104. Id. at 694.
105. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 634. The adoption of a per se rule raises
constitutional issues. However, it is beyond the scope of this note to discuss the
constitutional issues raised by the adoption of a per se rule. For a discussion of
constitutional issues, see generally Shapiro, supra note 6; Note, Custody Denials
to Parents in Same-Sex Relationships: An Equal Protection Analysis, 102 HARv.
L. REV. 617 (1989).
106. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 634.
107. Thigpen, 730 S.W.2d 510.
108. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 639.
109. Id. at 513.
110. Id. at 634-35.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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child."' Courts using this approach require a causal link to be
established between the parent's conduct and harm to the child." 4
In S.N.E. v. R.L.B.," 5 the Alaska Supreme Court adopted the
"nexus test" approach. 1 6 In S.N.E., the father sought a change of
custody due to the mother's involvement in an intimate same-sex
relationship. The superior court awarded custody to the father,
and the mother appealed.1 7 The Alaska Supreme Court reversed
the order of the superior court finding that "[c]onsideration of a
parent's conduct is appropriate only when the evidence supports a
finding that a parent's conduct has or reasonably will have an
adverse impact on the child and his best interests."" 8
IV. THE ANALYSIS
A. North Carolina Fails to Consider the Per Se and "Permissive
Determinative Inference" Approaches
In Pulliam, the North Carolina Court of Appeals did not con-
sider adopting either the per se or "permissive determinative
inference" approaches to determine whether a parent's involve-
ment in an intimate same-sex relationship adversely affects the
child. 119 In its brief opinion, the Court of Appeals began its analy-
sis by discussing North Carolina child custody law in change of
custody proceedings. 2 ° The court then stated the general rule in
North Carolina that "there must be 'a nexus' between the change
of circumstances and the adverse effects on the child.' 2 ' The court
113. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 635. Courts in 28 states have adopted this
approach. These states include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, Washington. Id. at 635 n.67. Also, the District of Columbia statutorily
mandates that child custody determinations be made without regard to sexual
orientation. Id.
114. Deirdre Larkin Runnette, Comment, Judicial Discretion And The
Homosexual Parent: How Montana Courts Are And Should Be Considering A
Parent's Sexual Orientation In Contested Custody Cases, 57 MONT. L. REV. 177,
184 (1996).
115. S.N.E., 699 P.2d 875.
116. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 635 n.67.
117. S.N.E., 699 P.2d at 877.
118. Id. at 879.
119. Pulliam, - N.C. App. __, 476 S.E.2d 446.
120. Id. at -, 476 S.E.2d at 449.
121. Id.
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further noted that evidence of 'speculation or conjecture that a
detrimental change may take place sometime in the future' will
not support a change in custody."'22 Applying these rules, the
court concluded that the order of the trial judge must fail since the
evidence presented by Pulliam did not show that the children
have been or will be adversely affected by Smith's relationship
with Tipton.'23
The Pulliam court, however, failed to address the policy rea-
sons behind rejecting the per se and "permissive determinative
inference" approaches. Jurisdictions that have adopted one of the
above approaches, as well as some jurisdictions that have adopted
the "nexus test" approach, have reasoned that homosexual par-
ents should be denied custody of their children because: (1) homo-
sexual orientation will subject the child to social condemnation
and embarrassment;1 24 (2) homosexual influences will adversely
affect the child's sexual orientation; 125 and (3) children will be
exposed to immoral and illegal conduct.' 26
(1) Social Condemnation
Jurisdictions which have rejected the per se and "permissive
determinative inference" approaches in favor of a "nexus test"
approach have addressed the presumed adverse effects of societal
prejudice on the child. In response to the contention that the
child will be subjected to social condemnation and humiliation,
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See generally Stephen B. Pershing, "Entreat Me Not To Leave Thee":
Bottoms v. Bottoms And The Custody Rights of Gay and Lesbian Parents, 3 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 289, 303-11 (1994). The Missouri Court of Appeals denied a
lesbian mother custody of her children stating:
Union, Missouri is a small, conservative community with a population of
about 5,000. Homosexuality is not openly accepted or widespread. We
wish to protect the children from peer pressure, teasing, and possible
ostracizing they may encounter as a result of the 'alternative life style'
their mother has chosen.
S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
125. Note, Custody Denials to Parents in Same-Sex Relationships: An Equal
Protection Analysis, supra note 105, at 617; Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983,
986 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
126. Note, Custody Denials to Parents in Same-Sex Relationships: An Equal
Protection Analysis, supra note 105, at 617; See generally Pershing, supra note
126, at 292-303.
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courts have cited Palmore v. Sidoti127 for the principle that possi-
ble injury from private bias and social stigma cannot be used to
remove a child from the custody of a parent.
128
In Palmore, a father sought a change of custody because of
the mother's involvement in an interracial relationship, resulting
in marriage two months later. 129  The trial court granted the
father's motion stating:
[Diespite the strides that have been made in bettering relations
between the races in this country, it is inevitable that [the child]
127. Palmore, 466 U.S. 429 (1984). See also Note, Custody Denials to Parents
in Same-Sex Relationships: An Equal Protection Analysis, supra note 105.
Possible or speculative injury from private biases associated with a custodial
parent's involvement in a same-sex relationship in itself should not divest a
parent of custody of a child. Id. at 626-627. Neither the race nor gender of a
custodial parents' significant other should be held to per se adversely affect a
child. Id.
128. Pershing, supra note 124, at 306-7. In M.A.B. v. R.B., the court stated:
Of overriding importance is that within the context of a loving and
supportive relationship, there is no reason to think that the girls will be
unable to manage whatever anxieties may flow from the community's
disapproval of their mother .... If defendant retains custody, it may be
that because the community is intolerant of her differences these girls
may sometimes have to bear themselves with greater than ordinary
fortitude. But this does not necessarily portend that their moral welfare
or safety will be jeopardized. It is just as reasonable to expect that they
will emerge better equipped to search out their own standards of right
and wrong, better able to perceive that the majority is not always correct
in its moral judgments, and better able to understand the importance of
conforming their beliefs to the requirements of reason and tested
knowledge, not the constraints of currently popular sentiment or
prejudice. Taking the children from the defendant can be done only at
the cost of sacrificing those very qualities they will find most sustaining
in meeting the challenges inevitably ahead. Instead of forbearance and
feelings of protectiveness it will foster in them a sense of shame for their
mother. Instead of courage and the precept that people of integrity do
not shrink from bigots, it counsels the easy option of shirking difficult
problems and following the course of expedience. Lastly, it diminishes
their regard for the rule of human behavior, everywhere accepted, that
we do not forsake those to whom we are indebted for love and nurture
merely because they are held in low esteem by others.
510 N.Y.S.2d at 964 (quoting M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1262-63 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1979)); see also S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 1985);
Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 987 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987). But see S.E.G. v.
R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (Concluded that Palmore does
not apply since "[h]omosexuals are not offered the constitutional protection that
race.... national origin,. . . and alienage.., have been afforded.").
129. Palmore, 446 U.S. at 430.
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will, if allowed to remain in her present situation... suffer from
the social stigmatization that is sure to come.130
The Florida District Court of Appeals affirmed the holding of the
trial court. 131
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Florida Court
of Appeals and held that possible injury from private bias associ-
ated with a custodial parent's involvement in an interracial rela-
tionship in itself cannot divest a parent of custody of a child. 13 2
(emphasis added) The Court found that the trial court's decision
to remove the children from their mother's custody was based
solely on the race of the mother's husband.1 3 3 The Court further
stated that "it is clear that the outcome would have been different
had [the mother] married a Caucasian male of similar respectabil-
ity."1 34 The Court concluded that private biases regarding inter-
racial marriages "may be outside the reach of the law, but the law
cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect." 135
The Court in Palmore acknowledged that racial prejudice
exists and children living in inter-racial homes may be subject to
different pressures and stresses as a result of societal prejudice. 136
Children living with a parent involved in an intimate same-sex
relationship will also be subject to different pressures. Courts
have reasoned that since societal prejudice and bias concerning
the race of one's partner cannot be the sole basis for removing a
child from the custody of a parent, neither can societal prejudice
and bias concerning the sex of one's partner.137
(2) Influencing Sexual Orientation
In response to claims that homosexual influences will
adversely affect the child's sexual orientation, courts have relied
130. Id. at 431.
131. Id. The Florida Supreme Court was without jurisdiction to review the
case because the Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. Id. The Court
agreed to hear the case because it raised "important federal concerns arising
from the Constitution's commitment to eradicating discrimination based on
race." Id. at 432.
132. Id. at 433.
133. Id. at 432.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 433.
137. See S.N.E., 699 P.2d at 879; M.A.B., 510 N.Y.2d. at 964; Conkel, 509
N.E.2d at 987.
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upon expert testimony. 38 In Conkel v. Conkel, the trial court
granted a homosexual father overnight visitation with his two
sons. 1 39 The mother appealed the ruling on numerous grounds,
one of which was that the children's exposure to their father
would "trigger homosexual tendencies in them."14 0 The Ohio
Court of Appeals rejected this argument since no evidence was
presented to support it.' The Court of Appeals then concluded
that "there is no consensus on what causes homosexuality, but
there is substantial consensus among experts that being raised by
a homosexual parent does not increase the likelihood that a child
will become homosexual."
142
In Woodruff, the North Carolina Court of Appeals also
acknowledged expert testimony in affirming the trial court's deci-
sion to grant unsupervised overnight visitation rights to a homo-
sexual father. 43 At trial a clinical psychologist testified that
there was no known cause of male homosexuality and that the
"son of a homosexual father will not inherit that
homosexuality.
" 144
(3) Morality and Illegality
Courts that grant either unsupervised visitation or primary
custody of the child to a parent involved in an intimate same-sex
relationship usually do not discuss the issue of morality. How-
ever, one court noted the following:
If defendant, [who is involved in a homosexual relationship],
retains custody [of the children], ... this does not necessarily por-
tend that their moral welfare and safety will be jeopardized. It is
just as reasonable to expect that they will emerge better equipped
to search out their own standards of right and wrong, better able
to perceive that the majority is not always correct in its moral
138. See Conkel, 509 N.E.2d at 986; Woodruff, 44 N.C. App. at 353, 260 S.E.2d
at 776.
139. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983.
140. Id. at 984.
141. Id. at 986.
142. Id. But see J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786, 793 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
("[E]xpert testimony is not a necessary basis for a determination that exposure to
a homosexual influence will adversely affect a child . . . . the father's
acknowledgment that he was living with an avowed homosexual certainly augurs
for potential harm to the child that the trial court was perfectly competent to
assess.").
143. Woodruff v. Woodruff, 44 N.C. App. 350, 260 S.E.2d 775 (1979).
144. Id. at 353, 260 S.E.2d at 776.
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judgments, and better able to understand the importance of con-
forming their beliefs to the requirements of reason and tested
knowledge, not the constraints of currently popular sentiment or
prejudice. 145
On the other hand, courts finding that a child is adversely
affected by a custodial parent's involvement in an intimate same-
sex relationship have relied on the premise that homosexual con-
duct is illicit and immoral. 146 In addition, where a state criminal-
izes certain sexual conduct, courts have found that exposure to
illegal conduct will adversely affect the child. 14
7
In Pulliam, the trial court found that Smith and Tipton had
engaged in oral sex in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-177.141
Pulliam also admitted that she and her husband participated in
oral sex.149 The Court of Appeals, however, did not discuss the
specific sexual conduct of either parent in its opinion.
The courts failure to conclude that Smith's violation of a crim-
inal statute per se adversely affects the child is consistent with
prior child custody case law in North Carolina. Adultery is also
statutorily prohibited in North Carolina. 150  However, courts
have consistently held that such conduct does not per se adversely
affect the child or render a parent unfit. 15 1 Thus, the Pulliam
courts failure to follow the "illegality" rationale is consistent with
prior case law.
B. North Carolina adopts the "Nexus Test" Approach
In Pulliam, the North Carolina Court of Appeals joined a
majority of states in adopting a "nexus test" approach to deter-
145. M.A.B. v. R.B, 510 N.Y.S.2d 960, 964 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (quoting M.P. v.
S.P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1262-63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
146. See Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985); See generally Thigpen v.
Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987).
147. See J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 792; Thigpen, 730 S.W.2d at 514. Other courts in
child custody disputes have ignored a State statute making certain sexual
conduct illegal. See In re R.E.W., 471 S.E.2d 6 (Ga. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 472
S.E.2d 295 (Ga. 1996) (father was awarded unsupervised visitation with his child
when he admitted engaging in sodomy, which is against the criminal law of
Georgia). It has also been reasoned that since an intimate same-sex relationship
is not legally recognized, a parent involved in such relationship is unsuitable.
Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1981).
148. Record at 32.
149. Brief for Appellant at 17.
150. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (1995). Adultery and fornication are
misdemeanors in North Carolina. Id.
151. See supra notes 70-71.
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mine if a child is adversely affected by a parent's involvement in
an intimate same-sex relationship. 152 In North Carolina, before a
judge finds that a custodial parent's involvement in an intimate
same-sex relationship adversely affects the child, "there must be
evidence that [such] conduct has or will likely have a deleterious
effect on the children."'5 3 Based on the evidence presented to the
court in Pulliam, it is clear that Carol Pulliam did not establish
that Smith's conduct has or will likely have an adverse effect on
the children.
Carol Pulliam sought a change of custody solely because of
Smith's involvement with Tipton. Pulliam testified that she
thought the children would be better off in her custody because of
the "impact of the homosexual thing" on the children.15 4 Further-
more, five out of seven allegations supporting Pulliam's contention
of a substantial change of circumstances directly addressed
Smith's involvement in an intimate same-sex relationship. 155
Therefore, Pulliam had the burden of establishing that Smith's
152. - N.C. App. -, 476 S.E.2d 446 (1996). The court stated that North
Carolina "has been consistent in rejecting the opinion that conduct of a parent,
ipso facto, has a deleterious effect on the children." Id. at __, 476 S.E.2d at 450.
Thus, the court simply followed the general rule in North Carolina.
153. Id. at -, 476 S.E.2d at 450.
154. Id. at -, 476 S.E.2d at 448.
155. Brief for Appellant at 4. In the complaint, Pulliam alleged that:
(a) Upon information and belief, that starting at some point in time after
the California Custody Order went into effect, the Defendant
determined that he was a homosexual and began to live the lifestyle of a
homosexual. (b) Upon information and belief, that on or about the 20th
day of February, 1994, the Defendant had a homosexual lover move into
his home at 9 Roberts Street, Fletcher, North Carolina. That during the
time the homosexual lover was living with Defendant, the two minor
children were also living with the Defendant. (c) Upon information and
belief, the Defendant and his homosexual lover shared the same
bedroom, and that the two minor children were aware of this behavior.
(d) Upon information and belief, that on or about the 18th day of
August, 1994, the Defendant told the two minor children that he was a
homosexual and explained to the two minor children what it meant to be
a homosexual. (e) That the Defendant told the Plaintiff on or about the
16th day of August, 1994, that the Defendant was a homosexual. (f)
Upon information and belief, the Defendant lacks the necessary
emotional stability necessary to properly care for the two minor
children. (g) Since the rendition of the California decree the Plaintiff
has re-married and is able to provide a fit, proper and stable home for
the minor children.
Record at 6-7.
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involvement with Tipton adversely affects or will likely adversely
affect the children.
Pulliam did not present any evidence suggesting that Smith's
conduct harmed or would likely harm the oldest child. The only
evidence presented to the trial judge which suggested that Smith's
relationship harmed the youngest child was the fact that the child
became upset the night that Smith told him he was a homosex-
ual. 15 6 Based on this evidence, the trial judge inferred that
Smith's relationship with Tipton harmed the children or would
likely harm the children if custody remained with Smith.
If the court had adopted either the per se or "permissive deter-
minative inference" approach, the mere fact that Smith and Tip-
ton were involved in a homosexual relationship would have been
sufficient to justify the trial judge's findings. 157 However, if either
of these approaches had been adopted, the Court of Appeals would
have created an exception to the general rule in North Carolina
which requires a moving party to establish a nexus between the
changed circumstances and the harm or likely harm to the
child.15 8
C. Effect of Pulliam
The obvious effect of Pulliam is the adoption of the "nexus
test" approach to determine whether children are harmed or will
likely be harmed by a parent's involvement in an intimate same-
sex relationship. The holding in Pulliam also identifies specific
parental conduct which does not per se adversely affect a child.
First of all, a custodial parent that allows his or her same-sex
partner to live in the home will not per se adversely affect the
child. Second, a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-177 in the pri-
vacy of one's own bedroom does not per se adversely affect a child.
Finally, a custodial parent who embraces and kisses his same-sex
partner in front of a child will not per se adversely affect a child.
Pulliam also identifies specific findings which will support a
conclusion that there has been a substantial change in circum-
stances which adversely affect the child. 159 The trial judge found
that Frederick Smith's relationship with Tim Tipton: (1) "will
expose" the children to "unfit and improper influences"; (2) "is det-
156. Pulliam, _ N.C. App. at -, 476 S.E.2d at 448.
157. See supra notes 101-02 and 106.
158. Ramirez-Barker, 107 N.C. App. at 78, 418 S.E.2d at 678-79.
159. The Court of Appeals found that the findings of the trial judge supported
the conclusions of law. Pulliam, - N.C. App at _, 476 S.E.2d at 449.
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rimental to the best interest and welfare of the two minor chil-
dren"; and (3) is likely to cause the oldest child emotional
difficulties.16 0
Based on these findings, the trial judge concluded: (1) that
Smith did not provide "a fit and proper environment in which to
rear the two minor children," (2) that "there had been "a substan-
tial change of circumstances ... affecting the two minor children
or that will likely or probably adversely affect the two minor chil-
dren", and (3) that "it was in the best interest of the two minor
children that they not reside under the same roof as Mr. Tipton or
any other person with whom the Defendant is having a homosex-
ual relationship."1 6" ' Thus, where a moving party can present
competent evidence on which the trial judge can rely to make sim-
ilar findings, Pulliam will support a conclusion of a substantial
change of circumstances which adversely affect the child.
Pulliam, however, is limited in two respects. First, the deci-
sion does not eliminate the effects of prejudice and bias in custody
determinations involving a parent in an intimate same-sex rela-
tionship. Second, the decision does not address the effect of a par-
ent's involvement in an intimate same-sex relationship on the
"best interest of the child" analysis.
The mere adoption of a "nexus test" approach does not elimi-
nate the effects of prejudice and bias on custody determina-
tions. "'62 The "nexus test" only requires that a moving party
present evidence which shows that the custodial parents conduct
harms or will likely harm the child. Evidence presented at trial
can be in the form of expert witnesses and/or lay witnesses who
testify to such harm. However, after the evidence is presented,
the trial judge alone determines which evidence is most credible,
and whether the moving party has satisfied its burden of showing
that the parent's same-sex relationship adversely affects or will
likely adversely affect the child. 16 3
160. Id. at -, 476 S.E.2d at 449. The trial judge also found that Smith's
relationship (4) may possibly expose the children "to embarrassment and
humiliation"; (5) "may impose a burden upon the two minor children by reason of
the social condemnation attached to such an arrangement; and (6) may cause
Joey emotional difficulties. The Court of Appeals held that these findings were
based on mere "speculation and conjecture" and thus cannot be used to support a
finding of changed circumstances. Id.
161. Record at 36.
162. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 660-64.
163. Many people, including judges, perceive lesbians and gay men as
exclusively sexual beings, while heterosexual parents are perceived as
154 [Vol. 19:131
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In Pulliam, no expert witness testified as to the harm or pos-
sible harm the minor children would suffer if custody was granted
to Smith. No witness testified as to any differences in the chil-
dren's behavior before and after they were told of their father's
homosexuality. Finally, no guardian ad litem was appointed to
represent the children and make recommendations as to what was
in their best interest. The only evidence of harm or likely harm to
the children was testimony indicating that the youngest child
became upset on the night that he was told his father was homo-
sexual.16 4 From this evidence, however, the trial judge still man-
aged to find that the children were harmed or likely to be harmed
by Smith's relationship with Tipton. 16 5
If the trial judge can justify a finding of harm or likely harm
from only a scintilla of evidence, a judge will clearly be able to
justify a finding of harm or likely harm if both parties present
competent evidence supporting their respective contentions. A
trial judge, given his broad discretion, would only need to find that
the evidence suggesting that the parent's conduct will harm the
child is more credible. Therefore, the adoption of the "nexus test"
approach will not altogether eliminate the effects of bias and prej-
udice on custody determinations.
Since the Pulliam court did not reach the issue of the "best
interest of the child,"'6 6 it is unclear how a parent's involvement
in a intimate same-sex relationship will factor into the "best inter-
est" analysis in initial and change of custody proceedings. In
North Carolina "trial courts are permitted to consider an array of
factors in order to determine what is in the best interest of the
child. Furthermore, these factors may include the consideration
of constitutionally protected choices or activities of parents." 67
Two factors that have been considered in child custody disputes
are a parents age168 and religious preferences. 169
people who, along with many other activities in their lives, occasionally
engage in sex. The mere identification of a parent as lesbian or gay,
quite apart from proof of any sexual conduct, may become a relevant
factor for the court.
Id. at 624.
164. Brief for Appellant at 3.
165. Pulliam, - N.C. App. at -, 476 S.E.2d at 448.
166. __ N.C. App. at -, 476 S.E.2d at 450.
167. Phelps, 337 N.C. at 344, 446 S.E.2d at 22.
168. Id.
169. Peterson, 111 N.C. App. 712, 433 S.E.2d 770; MacLagan, __ N.C. App.
, 473 S.E.2d 778.
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In Phelps v. Phelps, the North Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed a trial court's decision denying a fifty-five year old father
custody of his child and awarding custody to a thirty-three year
old mother. The trial court stated that the child is young and Mr.
Phelps "is not a young man, and... it is important that this child
be raised in one home. And that home has to be the one that is
apparently going to last the longest."170 The North Carolina
Supreme Court held that the age of a parent can be used as a
factor in the "best interest" analysis. 1 71 The court stated that:
It is simple logic that all else being equal a fifty-five-year-old per-
son has a shorter remaining lifespan than a thirty-three-year-old
person. The consideration of continuity and stability in the life of
a child will logically lead a judge to consider the age of a parent.
We conclude that considerations of all aspects of both parents'
lives, including the potential for continuity and stability, is neces-
sary to promote the governmental interest of granting custody
based on the best interest of the child. 172
Unlike age, the sexual orientation of a parent will not in itself
interfere with the "potential for continuity and stability." A court
could presume that a same-sex couple is less stable than an oppo-
site-sex couple because of the same-sex couple's inability to marry.
However, one court has held that the presumption that a same-
sex relationship might be less stable and long-lasting than a mari-
tal relationship is conjecture, and therefore, can't be used to
remove a child from the custody of a parent.
173
In Peterson v. Rogers, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
held that "although a court may consider a child's spiritual wel-
fare as part of the best interests determination, a court may not
base its findings on its preference for any religion or particular
faith." 174 The court further held that "a limited inquiry into the
religious practices of the parties is permissible if such practices
may adversely affect the physical or mental health or safety of the
child." 175
Similar reasoning could be applied in child custody disputes
involving a parent in an intimate same-sex relationship. If such
reasoning were applied, a trial judge, when conducting a "best
170. Phelps, 337 N.C. at 349, 446 S.E.2d at 20.
171. Id. at 344, 446 S.E.2d at 22.
172. Id. at 354, 446 S.E.2d at 23.
173. S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 669 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 1985).
174. Peterson, 111 N.C. App. at 718, 433 S.E.2d at 774.
175. Id. at 719, 433 S.E.2d at 775.
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interest" analysis, would not be able to consider a parent's involve-
ment in an intimate same-sex relationship unless such relation-
ship was shown to adversely affect the child. Religious freedom,
however, is specifically protected by the First Amendment to the
Constitution. 76 Therefore, it is unclear whether similar protec-
tions must be given to parents involved in intimate same-sex
relationships.
Finally, the United States Supreme Court's holding in Pal-
more, that possible injury from private biases and social stigma
cannot be used to remove a child from the custody of a parent, may
also limit the courts ability to deny custody to a parent involved in
an intimate same-sex relationship. 77 In Phelps, however, the
North Carolina Supreme Court interpreted Palmore narrowly as
applying only to "suspect classes." 78 Therefore, all else being
equal, it is unclear whether the holding in Palmore could be used
to prevent courts in North Carolina from denying custody of a
child to a parent involved in an intimate same-sex relationship.
V. CONCLUSION
in Pulliam v. Smith, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
took a small step toward eliminating the effects of prejudice and
bias in child custody determinations which involve a parent in an
intimate same-sex relationship. In a change of custody proceed-
ing, Pulliam clearly provides that a moving party must provide
evidence showing that a parent's relationship adversely affects or
will likely adversely affect the child.
The adoption of the "nexus test," however, will not eliminate
prejudice and bias in initial and change of custody proceedings
involving a parent in an intimate same-sex relationship. There-
fore, courts must further define the parameters of the "nexus test"
so that the state, while fulfilling its duty to protect the welfare of
children, can also protect parents' interest in the care and custody
of their children.1 79
Vicki Parrott
176. See Gary M. Miller, Balancing the Welfare of Children with the Rights of
Parents: Peterson v. Rogers and the Role of Religion in Custody Disputes, 73 N.C.
L. REv. 1271, 1280 (1995).
177. Palmore, 466 U.S. 429.
178. Phelps, 337 N.C. at 353-54, 446 S.E.2d at 22-3.
179. See id. at 352, 446 S.E.2d at 22 (citing Stankowsky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 753 (1982)).
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